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2Abstract. Previous research has suggested that highly hypnotisable participants (‘highs’) are more1
sensitive to the bistability of ambiguous figures – as evidenced by reporting more perspective changes2
of a Necker cube – than low hypnotisable participants (‘lows’). This finding has been interpreted as3
supporting the hypothesis that highs have more efficient sustained attentional abilities than lows.4
However, the higher report of perspective changes in highs in comparison to lows may reflect the5
implementation of different expectation-based strategies as a result of differently constructed demand6
characteristics according to one’s level of hypnotisability. Highs, but not lows, might interpret an7
instruction to report perspective changes as an instruction to report many changes. Using a Necker cube8
as our bistable stimulus, we manipulated demand characteristics by giving specific information to9
participants of different hypnotisability levels. Participants were told that previous research has shown10
that people with similar hypnotisability as theirs were either very good at switching or maintaining11
perspective versus no information. Our results show that highs, but neither lows nor mediums, were12
strongly influenced by the given information. However, highs were not better at maintaining the same13
perspective than participants with lower hypnotisability. Taken together, these findings favour the view14
that the higher sensitivity of highs in comparison to lows to the bistability of ambiguous figures reflect15
the implementation of different strategies.16
17
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Introduction44
3Within the field of hypnosis, it is widely acknowledged that people are not equally responsive to1
hypnotic suggestions (suggestions for altered experiences of reality or volition) (Heap, Brown, &2
Oakley, 2004; Hilgard, 1965; Kallio & Ihamuotila, 1999; Laurence, Beaulieu-Prévost, & Chéné, 2008;3
Perry, Nadon, & Button, 1992; Shor & Orne, 1963; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962; but see Barber,4
1969; Spanos, 1986). Although it is largely believed by researchers that differences in hypnotisability5
must be reflected in participants’ other traits (i.e., from outside the hypnotic context), attempts to6
determine potential different cognitive profiles between highs and lows rarely find replicated correlates7
that predict with better than r = 0.2, when tested in unrelated contexts (Council, Kirsch, & Hafner, 1986;8
Heap, Brown, & Oakley, 2004; Laurence, Beaulieu-Prévost, & Chéné, 2008). In addition, there is no9
firm genetic, physiological, behavioural or phenomenological marker differentiating highs from lows.10
In sum, why some people are more responsive to hypnotic suggestions than others is still an unresolved11
issue.12
One of the more promising avenue of research has been the hypothesis that highs exhibit more13
efficient executive control than lows, evidenced by greater sustained and selective attentional abilities14
(Crawford, 1991; 1994; Crawford, Brown, & Moon, 1993; for a recent review about the role of frontal15
executive functions in hypnosis, see Parris, in press). However, results for different baseline16
performances – from outside hypnotic context – according to participants’ hypnotisability level in17
various executive and attentional dimensions are mixed, with studies reporting no significant18
behavioural differences (Cojan, Piguet, & Vuilleumier, 2015; Dienes et al., 2009; Egner, Jamieson, &19
Gruzelier, 2005; Iani, Ricci, Gherri, & Rubichi, 2006; Iani, Ricci, Baroni, & Rubichi, 2009; Raz, Fan,20
& Posner, 2005; Varga, Németh, & Szekely, 2011) but, importantly, other studies showing significant21
differences in either direction (Crawford et al., 1993; Dixon, Brunet, & Laurence, 1990; Dixon &22
Laurence, 1992; Farvolden & Woody, 2004; Miller, Hennessy, & Leibowitz, 1973; Miller, 1975;23
Rubichi, Ricci, Padovani, & Scaglietti, 2005; Wallace, 1986; Wallace &Garrett, 1973; Wallace, Garrett,24
& Anstadt, 1974; Wallace, Knight, & Garrett, 1976). Recently, a new layer of complexity has been25
added to this already tangled issue, as it has been shown (Cojan et al., 2015 and Lifshitz & Raz, 2015)26
that similar behavioural levels of Stroop or Stroop-like interference between highs and lows were27
4accompanied by different patterns of neural activity. Highs and lows may have different cognitive styles1
or different context-dependent strategies.2
Potential attentional differences between highs and lows have been investigated by means of3
different experimental procedures, especially by means of conflicting (e.g., Stroop), distracting or4
priming paradigms (Cojan, Piguet, & Vuilleumier, 2015; Dienes et al., 2009; Iani et al., 2009; Raz et5
al., 2005; Varga et al., 2011) and, finally, by means of specific visual illusions. Some evidence suggest6
that highs and mediums are more sensitive than lows to the Ponzo illusion, that highs report more7
changes in direction of autokinetic movement (illusory movement of a light in a dark room) and more8
reversals of a Necker cube than lows (Crawford et al., 1993; Miller et al., 1973; Miller, 1975; Wallace9
& Garrett, 1973; Wallace et al., 1973; 1974; 1976; Wallace, 1986; but see Jamieson & Sheehan, 2002).10
Previous research advocated that responsiveness to bistable figures depends on focusing attention11
towards the relevant and salient cues while filtering (disattending) irrelevant cues (Power & Day, 1973).12
In this regard, Crawford and colleagues (1993) interpret the higher sensitivity of highs in comparison to13
lows to bistable figures and visual illusions as reflecting different attentional abilities; with highs14
showing more efficient sustained and disattentional abilities than lows. In other words, highs may report15
a higher rate of perspective switches in a Necker cube because of a higher ability to focus on the salient16
cues and to disattend the non-salient ones.17
However, the higher sensitivity of highs to bistable figures or visual illusions might reflect18
expectation-based strategy differences rather than baseline attentional differences (Dienes et al., 2009).19
We have to know what participants are trying to achieve during the task otherwise results are difficult20
to interpret. If the instruction consists in asking participants to report every perspective change, as was21
the case in previous studies comparing highs and lows on the perception of bistable figures (Crawford22
et al., 1993; Wallace, 1986; Wallace et al., 1976), the higher rate of switches by highs might reflect the23
implementation of specific strategies in order to fulfil what they thought to be a “good high” in this24
context (Orne, 1969; Orne, 1959; Spanos, 1986; for recent instances of the effect of demand25
characteristics in different perceptual phenomena and new methods to unveil them, see Firestone, 2013 ;26
Firestone & Scholl, 2014 ; Martin, Sackur, Anlló, Naish & Dienes 2016). That is, they might have27
inferred that the experimenter expected them to see many perspective switches, while lows are simply28
5neutral about the kind of switch rate expected by the experimenter. To be clear, we are not arguing that1
highs may be better than lows/mediums in interpreting demand characteristics, but that different demand2
characteristics are inferred given one’s level of hypnotic suggestibility. In addition, or alternatively, it3
might also be argued that lows might have been less motivated than highs in doing the task, reporting4
less switches than highs.5
Here, we shall assay the weight of demand characteristics in behaviours that have been6
attributed to differential attentional abilities across hynotisability levels. Namely, we tested whether7
when asked to report perceptual switches of a bistable figure, participants would differentially adapt8
their performance to specific information according to their level of hypnotisability.9
We tested this hypothesis using a Necker cube as the bistable stimulus. Using a design close to10
the one of Crawford et al., (1993), we tested three groups of participants, highs, mediums and lows, thus11
spanning the whole spectrum of hypnotisability levels. Participants had to report every perspective12
change of a Necker cube. In the first block — Neutral Block — of trials, no specific information was13
given to participants. In the second block — Test Block —, participants were either informed that14
previous research had demonstrated that people with their specific level of hypnotisability had been15
shown to be able to change perspective easily (Switch Condition) or to maintain the same perspective16
easily (Maintain Condition) and that we would like to test this hypothesis with a Necker cube. Our17
inclusion of the group of mediums enables us to test whether any difference in the rate of perspective18
switches is due to highs or lows showing extreme behaviour.19
20
21
Method22
Participants. Participants who took part in this experiment had been screened for hypnotisability with23
the French version of the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A (Shor & Orne, 1962;24
Anlló, Becchio & Sackur, in press). This scale consists in a relaxation-based induction phase followed25
by 12 suggestions, encompassing cognitive suggestions (e.g., hallucination), motor suggestions (e.g.26
hands moving together) and challenge suggestions (to not succeed at an action e.g. to not be able to bend27
6the arm because of arm rigidity). Subjects’ score is determined by the number of suggestions they pass1
according to specific criteria. As an illustration, the magnetic hands suggestion is phrased as followed:2
3
“Now I want you to imagine a force attracting your hands toward each other, pulling them4
together. As you think of this force pulling your hands together, they will move together, slowly5
at first, but they will move closer together, closer and closer together as though a force were6
acting them… moving… moving… closer… closer….” (Shor & Orne, 1962, p. 9).7
8
We recruited 21 highly hypnotisable participants (highs) scoring 9-12 (M = 9.6, SD = 0.8; 12 females;9
Mean Age = 24.3, SD = 3.6), 24 moderately hypnotisable participants (mediums) scoring 5-8 (M = 6.2,10
SD = 1.2; 18 females; Mean Age = 25.3, SD = 4.3) and 23 low hypnotisable participants (lows) scoring11
0-4 (M = 2.6, SD = 1.2; 12 females; Mean Age = 25.6, SD = 4.5). Each subject was paid 5€ for12
participation, the whole experiment lasting approximately 30 min. Participants had normal or corrected-13
to-normal vision.14
Written informed consent was obtained from each participant and the experiment was conducted15
in agreement with the Declaration of Helsinki (2008) and approved by the Ethics Committee of the16
Université Paris Descartes (Paris 5).17
18
Experimental setup and Apparatus. The experiment was conducted in a quiet experimental room.19
Stimuli were delivered by a MacBook Pro, processor 2,53GHz, Intel Core i5. All stimuli were displayed20
using Matlab (MathWorks Inc R2009b) with the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997).21
22
Stimuli and Experimental design. Participants were seated at about 60 cm from the screen. A Necker23
cube (edge size = 1.7cm/1.6°) was displayed against a light-grey background at the centre of the screen24
during periods of 60s. During these periods, participants had to report each time they saw a change in25
cube perspective by means of key presses. As training, before the first period, participants were shown26
the ambiguous Necker cube on the left of the screen, with two non-ambiguous cube drawings on the27
right of the screen, illustrating the two possible interpretations of the ambiguous cube (see Fig. 1).28
7Participants were asked to tell the experimenter once they observed that the ambiguous cube could1
indeed switch back and forth between the two perspectives represented by the ambiguous cube.2
The experiment comprised two blocks composed of five 60s periods each. There was a short3
break of 5s between each consecutive 60s period. The first block (Neutral Block) was presented to4
participants as a training block. Instructions were as close as possible to Crawford et al., 1993’s:5
6
TRAINING. The cube will be displayed for 60s at a time. Press the key with an upwards arrow drawn on7
it [corresponding to the j key] when you see the cube changing direction upwards, press the key with a8
downwards arrow drawn on it [corresponding to the f key] when you see the cube changing direction9
downwards. When you are looking at the cube, look at it as you normally would. Do not blink excessively10
[Translated from the French version given to participants].11
12
The second block (Test Block), presented as the test block to participants, was preceded by specific13
information. According to the condition participants were (randomly) assigned to – Switch Condition14
(SC) or Maintain Condition (MC) — the information specified that previous research had shown that15
they were able to shift perspective easily or to maintain the same perspective easily, respectively:16
17
SECOND PHASE. We know that people like you with high (for mediums: some) hypnotic abilities (for18
lows: that are resistant to hypnosis) have a great ability to change [in the SC] of (to maintain the same19
[in the MC]) perspective. We would like to test this hypothesis with the cube. As before, when you are20
looking at the cube, look at it as you normally would. Do not blink excessively [Translated from the21
French version given to participants].22
23
Because the nature of the information given to participants depended on their hypnotisability level, at24
the very beginning of the experiment (i.e., before Neutral Block and its instruction phase) participants25
were reminded what their level of hypnotisability was:26
27
8We recruited you for this experiment because you have shown high (for mediums: some) hypnotic1
abilities (for lows: showed resistance to hypnosis) during screening [Translated from the French version2
given to participants].3
4
5
6
.7
8
9
10
11
Figure 1. Stimulus and Procedure. In the instruction phase, participants were shown the ambiguous cube (left12
cube) accompanied by two non-ambiguous cubes (right bold cubes) showing the two possible alternatives the13
ambiguous cube could alternate between. Participants were described the perspective shown by the bold cube on14
the top as the upwards perspective and the bold cube on the bottom as the downwards perspective. Participants15
were instructed to press the key with an upwards arrow drawn on it (j key) when the cube switched from the16
downwards to the upwards perspective and the key with a downwards arrow drawn on it (f key) when the cube17
switched from the upwards to the downwards perspective.18
19
Results. Two participants were excluded because debriefing showed that they did not understand the20
task. One participant was excluded because 64% of her/his key presses were identical key responses,21
suggesting again a misunderstanding about the task. In total, we thus rejected two participants from the22
group of highs and one from the group of lows. Episodes separated by repeated key presses were then23
conjoined. Next, we rejected as outliers episodes shorter than 600 ms (1.8 %) and more than three24
standard deviations above each participant median duration (2.2%).25
26
Mean frequency of perspective switches according to groups and conditions. Figure 2 shows the27
mean frequency of perspective switches according to groups and conditions. Mean number of switches28
per minute was numerically higher in highs (M = 21, SE = 2.2) than in lows (M = 15, SE = 1.3) and29
9mediums (M = 14.2, SE = 1.1) in the Neutral Block. As for Test Block, in the Switch Condition, highs1
(M = 24.2, SE = 3.6) switched numerically more than lows (M = 16.5, SE = 1.7) and mediums (M =2
16.6, SE = 1.1). Finally, in the Maintain Condition, while every group seemed to switch less than in the3
Switch Condition, no group markedly differentiated from one another as shown by their mean frequency4
of switches; highs (M = 11.8, SE = 2.9), lows (M = 13.6, SE = 2.5), mediums (M = 12.3, SE = 1.3).5
6
Bayes factors. In order to evaluate the strength of evidence for the alternative hypotheses H1 versus H07
(Morey, Romeijn, & Rouder, 2016), we report Bayes Factors, B, for the relevant tests with one degree8
of freedom. Following Jeffrey (1939), we consider that a B above 3 indicates “substantial evidence” for9
H1 over H0 and, by symmetry, a B below 1/3 indicates substantial evidence for H0 over H1 (substantial10
only in the sense that the given evidence is just worth considering, Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014).11
Therefore, a B between 1/3 and 3 indicates data insensitivity: H1 and H0 cannot be distinguished.12
Below we test differences in the mean frequency of perspective switches according to groups13
and conditions by means of Poisson regressions on the raw count of switches per minute. To know the14
relative evidence for H1 vs.H0, the predictions of H1 need to be specified. Crawford et al., (1993) found15
a mean difference of 6.06 switches per minute between highs and lows. Based on this, we can speculate16
that mediums should show a higher rate of perspective changes than lows, up to a maximum of 6. In17
order to have the same units between Crawford et al., 1993’s size effect and the coefficients of Poisson18
regressions, we took the log of the ratio between lows’ and mediums’ mean switch rate in Crawford et19
al., 1993’s, giving a value of 0.39. Then we modelled the alternative hypothesis H1 with a uniform20
distribution referred to as: BU[0, 0.39] (Dienes, 2014, 2015). In addition, regarding the potential differences21
in mean switch rate between highs and the other groups we might find, we modelled H1 with a half-22
normal distribution, written: BH(0, 0.39).23
24
Regression. First, there was evidence in favour of H0 over the H1 for the difference between lows and25
mediums in Neutral Block (ß = 0.0280, SE = 0.0649, z = 0.43, p = 0.666, BU[0, 0.39] = 0.15) as well as in26
Test Block in the Maintain (ß = 0.0254, SE = 0.0959, z = 0.265, p = 0.791, BU[0, 0.39] = 0.25) and27
10
Switch (ß = - 0.0195, SE = 0.0624, z = - 0.31, p = 0.755, BU[0, 0.39] = 0.26) condition. That is, these1
groups did not differ in their mean switch rate. Accordingly, in all the following analyses, we considered2
a factor Group with two levels: highs on the one hand and lows/mediums on the other.3
Then, we ran the Poisson regression with factors of block (neutral/test), instruction4
(switch/maintain) and group (lows + mediums versus highs), see table 1 for results of the triple5
interaction. There was evidence for the three-way interaction (ß = 0.052, SE = 0.0107, z = 4.87, p = 1.106
× 10-06, BH(0, 0.39)= 7966.90). We thus analysed the instruction by group two-way interactions within each7
block. For the Neutral Block, there was evidence for no instruction by group interaction (ß = -0.0134,8
SE = 0.0589, z = -0.23, p > 0.819, BH(0, 0.39) = 0.18). In Test Block, there was marginal evidence for the9
two-way interaction (ß = - 0.125, SE = 0.0581, z = -2.15, p < 0.0312, BH(0, 0.39)= 2.77), to the effect that10
highs responded more to the instructions (delta switch rate = 12.4) than lows and mediums (delta =11
3.61).12
In addition, to test whether we replicated Crawford et al., (1984) we tested the differences13
between groups in Neutral Block. Replicating Crawford et al., there was indeed evidence for an effect14
of group (ß = -0.179, SE = 0.0589, z = -3.05, p < 0.005, BH(0, 0.39)= 27.15), such that highs had a higher15
switch rate than lows and mediums. For comparison, we also compared groups in Test Block. In the16
Switch Condition, highs had a higher switch rate than lows + mediums (ß = 0.17, SE = 0.063, z = 2.68,17
p < .01, BH(0, 0.39)= 11.00), while in the Maintain Condition, highs switched to the same extent as lows +18
mediums (11.8 and 12.9, respectively) (ß = -0.086, SE = 0.11, z = - 0.81, p > 0.4, BH(0, 0.39)= 0.16).19
20
21
Table 1. Regression results. Table shows results of the triple interaction for the Poisson regression.22
23
24
Figure 2. Mean frequency of perspective changes. Graph shows the mean frequency of switches per minute for25
Neutral and Test Block, for every group (lows, mediums and highs) and, finally, for the Switch (dashed line) and26
Maintain (continuous line) condition.27
28
11
Discussion1
When no specific information is given to participants (Neutral Block), highs in comparison to lows and2
mediums show a higher rate of perspective changes with a Necker cube. In this respect, our results are3
in keeping with previous research having shown the same superiority effect of highs in comparison to4
lows when tested with a Necker cube or other bistable percepts (Crawford et al., 1993; Wallace, 1986;5
Wallace & Garrett, 1973; Wallace, Knight, & Garrett, 1976; but see Jamieson & Sheehan, 2002).6
However, when specific information about their ability is provided to participants, highs in comparison7
to lows or mediums are much more affected by this specific information as shown by the triple8
interaction block by group by instruction.9
Our results provide an alternative interpretation to the attentional account of groups switch rate10
differences (Crawford et al., 1993), that is in terms of behavioural strategy differences (Spanos, 1986;11
cf Sheehan, Donovan, & Macleod, 1988). We can speculate that highs reported more perspective12
changes in Neutral Block (and in previous studies reporting such effect) because they thought that this13
was the behaviour expected from them. Because they know they are highs and that the instruction was14
(both in our study and previous ones) to report the number of perspective changes, they might have15
inferred that they have to report a lot of changes and adopted strategies to fit their expectations.16
Therefore, changing their expectations would change their performances more than lows and mediums.17
If our interpretation is correct, this means that highs interpreted the information given before18
Test Block (switch or maintain information) in a different way than lows and mediums did. While highs19
took the information at face value, and were motivated to respond to it, lows and mediums may have20
been less motivated. As a result, highs performed in Test Block as informed so that their performance21
deviated from neutral block as a function of the informational content of the condition they were22
assigned to (especially in the Maintain Condition). (As for the Switch Condition, highs may have23
reached ceiling in Neutral Block, preventing them to switch still more in Test Block). By contrast, the24
performance of lows and mediums was unchanged by the information given to them.25
Another question that follow-up studies should address is whether highs adopted specific26
perceptual strategies in order to fit the content of the before-test-block information or simply increased27
(in the Switch Condition) and reduced (in the Maintain Condition) the rate of their response28
12
(compliance). The literature suggests that highs usually do their best to experience the content of1
suggestions delivered to them (e.g. Cojan, Waber, Schwartz, Rossier, Forster, & Vuilleumier, 2009;2
Derbyshire, Whalley, & Oakley, 2009; Kirsch, Silva, Carone, Johnston, & Simon, 1989). The cognitive3
strategies that could maintain or switch a perspective include regulating attention to certain features to4
control bottom-up input (consider for example the longer switch times of meditators rather than non-5
meditators asked to maintain the perspective asked to maintain, Sauer, Lemke, Wittmann, Kohls,6
Mochty, & Walach, 2012). Whether or not highs are better or worse at this is an open question, not7
settled by the greater switching of highs rather than lows in Neutral Block; our results motivate the claim8
that is a matter of strategy choice rather than ability.9
The present results need to be tested for generalisability to differences between highs and lows10
in the context of other illusions. For example, highs in comparison to lows reported more changes in11
direction of autokinetic movement (Crawford et al., 1993; Wallace & Garrett, 1973). As our results12
suggest, it might be that highs inferred that it was expected from them to perceive a lot of movements13
and so they used different strategies from lows to fit their experience to that implied by demand14
characteristics. The same explanation might be given to account for the higher frequency of apparent15
reversals in highs than in lows for rotary illusions (Wallace et al., 1976) or for the higher sensitivity of16
mediums and highs in comparison to lows to the Ponzo illusion (Miller et al., 1975).17
The results do not constitute a definitive argument against an account in terms of attentional18
abilities because the information we gave to participants before the test block was not explicit19
instructions to switch or maintain perspective. Therefore, we cannot fully exclude the possibility that20
highs (and lows and mediums for that matter) did not perform the best they could have been able to do.21
However, an alternative interpretation in terms of the implementation of different behavioural strategies22
between these populations remains a simple one. We showed that information about trait differences23
between highs and lows changed especially the behaviour of highs without us having to instruct them24
directly. Future studies with direct instructions for maintaining or switching perspective with motivation25
ratings will be necessary to favour one or another account.26
27
28
13
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Figure 1. Stimulus and Procedure. In the instruction phase participants were shown the ambiguous cube (left13
cube) accompanied by two non-ambiguous cubes (right bold cubes) showing the two possible alternatives the14
ambiguous cube could alternate between. Participants were described the perspective shown by the bold cube on15
the top as the upwards perspective and the bold cube on the bottom as the downwards perspective. Participants16
were instructed to press the key with an upwards arrow drawn on it (j key) when the cube switched from the17
downwards to the upwards perspective and the key with a downwards arrow drawn on it (f key) when the cube18
switched from the upwards to the downwards perspective.19
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Beta (ß)
Standard
Error z p-value
Intercept 2.736 0.0539 50.69 2.00 × 10-016
Block 0.0516 0.0107 4.81 1.49 × 10-06
Instruction
(Switch/Maintain) 0.140 0.0539 2.60 0.00927
Group -0.117 0.0539 -2.18 0.0292
Block*Instruction -0.109 0.0107 -10.20 2.00 × 10-016
Block*Group -0.0540 0.0107 -5.03 4.81 × 10-07
Instruction*Group -0.0611 0.0538 -1.13 0.257
Block*Group*Instruction 0.0522 0.0107 4.87 1.10 × 10-06
Table 1. Regression results. Table shows results of the triple interaction for the Poisson regression.1
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Figure 2. Mean frequency of perspective changes. Graph shows the mean frequency of switches per minute for15
Neutral and Test Block, for every group (lows, mediums and highs) and, finally, for the Switch (dashed line) and16
Maintain (continuous line) condition.17
